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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007 …nancial crisis, and particularly during the period 2008-2015, the US economy was characterized by very high excess reserves, a zero-bound policy rate, with a relatively lower focus on in ‡ation, and the introduction and management of the interest on reserves. During this period the were large reductions in the loan-to-deposit ratio and deposit rates exceeded the policy rate. 1 The deposits market may provide a signi…cant channel in explaining the role of monetary policy at the time, but so far this channel has received little attention. 2 Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2017) provide empirical evidence that in general the deposits channel can account for the entire transmission of monetary policy through bank balance sheets. They identify market power in the deposit markets driven by changes in the policy rate as the potential determinant of the deposits channel. Higher policy rates feed into the market power of banks which do not pass this increase on to deposit rates. This increases the policy-deposit rate spread resulting in deposit out ‡ows and a contraction of loans and economic activity and vice versa. This mechanism however, may fall short of explaining the lower zero-bound period 2008-2015, when despite the very low policy rates, with even negative deposit rate spreads, and despite the loss in their market power, banks channeled their increased deposits into excess reserves, thus reducing loans and economic activity. In this paper, I
propose two new potential determinants of the deposits channel that can help explain the role of monetary policy, particularly at the lower zero-bound period. These are, (i) precautionary liquidity due to credit risk and (ii) the interest on reserves. These two factors are shown to be more relevant determinants of the deposits channel for the lower zero bound period, as they both came into prominence just as the policy rate became ine¤ective. Through the deposits channel each of these factors, (precautionary liquidity, or the interest on reserves) can explain, (a) very low, or zero, optimal weights on in ‡ation in the Taylor rule, (b) a negative deposit rate spread, and signi…cantly (c) determinacy at the lower-zero bound. The theoretical …ndings in this paper can shed some light on the zero-interest rate policy pursued in countries that experienced large excess reserves, (i.e. Japan, U.S. and the UK), but also on why the interest on reserves was given a new focus by the US Fed and other central banks during the zero-bound period.
Background and Related Literature
At the centre of the Fed's policy focus following the 2007 …nancial crisis was the unprecedented levels of excess reserves and liquidity hoarding in the banking sector. The gradual quantitative easing between 2008-2013 contributed largely to the increased level of excess reserves (see Figure 1 ) and the dramatic drop in the loan-to-reserve ratio, (Figures 2 a and b) . However, the accumulation of excess reserves was not only the outcome of quantitative easing. There is su¢ cient evidence to suggest that during that period banks appeared more willing to hoard reserves rather than lend (see below). This is also clear from the loan-to-deposit ratio shown in Figures 2 a and b to be falling for all loans, including Commercial & Industrial loans. Indeed, the fall in loans was not just con…ned in the mortgage credit market, that had just been shocked with the subprime mortgage crisis, but was also evident in the production sector. With the policy rate …xed at the lower zero-bound during that period, this was an indication that other factors, beyond monetary policy or the large-scale quantitative easing, or con…dence in the housing market, were contributing to the accumulation of excess reserves and the deposits channel. 
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On the supply side, the observed high levels of excess reserves during that period have been attributed to precautionary reasons, or liquidity risk, that prompted banks to hoard their reserves and lend their surplus reserves to the inter-bank market at a high liquidity . On the demand side, the increased borrowing cost, combined with a drop in economic activity and the expectations of a looming recession, made households and …rms also unwilling to demand loans. Thus, a fall in the demand for loans in the non-…nancial sector is also believed to have contributed to the increase in excess reserves. This is a …rm balance sheet channel that a¤ects the cost of borrowing in relation to the …rm's net worth or collateral (Bernanke and Gertler 1995 , Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999 , Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011 , De Fiore and Tristani, 2011 . Empirical evidence suggests that both the supply of loans and the demand for loans channels were operational during that period. The demand for credit channel was more important for the households, but the supply side channel was more important for …rms and the production sector. 3 Overall, the impact of monetary policy was shown to be more signi…cant through precautionary liquidity and the credit supply channel in general, than the demand for credit channel (see Angelini, Nobili and Picillo 2011, Jiménez and Ongena 2012, Bianchi and Bigio, 2014, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró, 2015). 3 The supply side also exacerbated the recession by the way that the decline in the value of bank liabilities also reduced the level of insurance and thus collateral such liabilities provided to their holders, (Quadrini, 2017) .
The second factor that attracted much policy attention when excess reserves were high was the interest on reserves. In the aftermath of the …nancial crisis, when the US Fed was trying to manage liquidity at zero-bound policy rates, it placed much emphasis on the interest on reserves and very little on the required reserve ratio, which remained around its steady state level throughout that period (see Figure 1) . 4 
This paper: Innovations and Main Results
This paper focuses on the above observations and particularly on the fact that during the period 2008-2015 the US economy was characterized by, 5 (1) increased precautionary reserves and loan hoarding; (2) a persistent drop in loans, initially from the supply side and the balance sheet channel, but later also from the demand side as the recession started to set in; (3) a negative deposit rate spread, as the deposit rate exceeded the policy rate, (4) a zero-bound policy rate and overall a relatively lower focus on in ‡ation and (5) emphasis on a new monetary policy tool, the interest on reserves, which was preferred over the required reserve ratio. Although the recent literature provides plenty of support for (1) and (2) (see above), there has been little theoretical rationale for facts (3) , (4) and (5), particularly in combination with observations (1) and (2) . This paper attempts to bridge this gap.
The starting point is the existing evidence on (1) and (2) (see above literature), which
indicates that the accumulation of excess reserves was not purely the outcome of the quantity easing programme, but also of precautionary reserves and persistent loan hoarding. To examine the latter e¤ect, I introduce a DSGE model where both the credit supply and the demand for credit channels are operational, but where the credit supply side, and particularly the deposits channel, is shown to be more important for monetary policy, particularly at the zero-bound. The credit risk lies in the non-…nancial production sector, but this risk can create an accumulation of precautionary liquidity (reserve hoarding) in the …nancial sector (deposits market). This is in contrast to the bulk of the above literature where the risk lies in the interbank sector and it is usually modelled as random bank withdrawals, (i.e. Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie, 2011, Bianchi and Bigio, 2014). 6 For generality, I model the risk in the production of intermediate goods, although the results are expected to be robust when the risk lies anywhere in the non-…nancial sector, including the housing market. The key point is that when the …nancial sector perceives an underlying risk in the non-…nancial sector, excess reserves rise and this decreases the supply of loans to …rms in the non-…nancial sector through a change in the …nancial sector's balance sheet, while at the same time the rate o¤ered on liquid assets, the deposit rate here, rises relatively to the policy rate. Risk is also shown to increase the risk premium on the loan rate and thus the cost of borrowing of …rms, generating a cost channel.
Various policy scenaria are examined that are assessed in terms of welfare, where welfare is calculated based on a second order approximation of the household's utility function.
The results show that through the deposits channel, both precautionary liquidity and the interest on reserves are key determinants of monetary policy. It is shown that when banks hoard large amounts of excess reserves in response to a potential risk in the non-…nancial sector, the optimal response of the Taylor rule is to set a zero weight on the in ‡ation rate, which implies a lower zero-bound policy rate. This is shown to be a determinate outcome despite the violation of the Taylor principle. The key to this result is the fact that at times of high perceived credit risk, precautionary reserves rise but so does the deposit rate o¤ered by banks in relation to the policy rate (and interbank rate), as banks want to avoid deposit out ‡ows. The deposit rate is the rate at which households discount consumption and other portfolio decisions. With a high precautionary liquidity, the deposit rate can increase su¢ ciently to control the Euler equation and the output gap and hence in ‡ation and provide determinacy even when the policy rate is at the zero-bound. This case also implies a negative deposit rate spread. Intuitively, through accumulated precautionary liquidity and a reduction in lending, the markets self-discipline the macro economy, reducing the output gap and in ‡ation.
Within this framework the paper also examines the role of the interest on reserves.
It is shown that the use of the interest on reserves can facilitate monetary policy (Taylor rule) and increase welfare more than the required reserve ratio. This is because the latter is shown to have con ‡icting e¤ects through the deposits channel, whereas the interest on reserves has complementary e¤ects through this channel.
More importantly, it is shown that through the deposits channel the interest on reserves can act as the main tool of monetary policy, even at the zero-bound, producing higher welfare gains than a simple Taylor rule. Recently, Cochrane (2014) and Hall and Reis (2016) show that in models that share the properties of the …scal theory of the price level, the interest on reserves can determine in ‡ation (or the price level). Here, I show that even in a conventional DSGE model of …nancial frictions, absent of theory of the price level properties, the interest on reserves can pin down a determinant equilibrium through its e¤ects on the deposits channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4, introduces the main framework and derives the decisions of households, …rms and banks. It also describes the aggregate equilibrium, the log-linearized system and the steady state properties of the model. Section 5 examines the role of precautionary reserves, the interest on reserves and the required reserve ratio for monetary policy, under various simple optimal policy rules and following …nancial and supply shocks. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider a closed economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of …nancial intermediation with nominal frictions (sticky prices), …nancial frictions (risky loans to …rms), a cost channel, a balance sheet channel and bank capital requirements.
There is a representative household, a continuum of intermediate goods …rms producing di¤erentiated goods, a competitive …nal good …rm, a competitive bank with two branches, a deposit and a lending branch, and a central bank that can use the policy rate, the interest on reserves and the required reserve ratio as its policy tools.
Intermediate goods …rms borrow from the lending bank to fund wage payments to households. Their production is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, which makes their loan repayment risky requiring a fraction of their output as collateral. 
Households
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, 
; (2) where p t denotes the price of the …nal good and t pt p t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate. With a positive deposit rate and taking wages and prices as given, the …rst order conditions with respect to c t ; d t and e t are, 7 The inclusion of the …xed cost of equity issuing, % E is mainly for adjusting the steady state value of R e t :
w t = vh t c t ;
Equations (3) and (4) describe the household's Euler equation and labour supply respectively, while equation (5) is the arbitrage-free condition between the return on bank capital and the risk free deposit rate. Thus the deposit rate determines the intertemporal choices of consumers and also sets the benchmark rate for the equity rate.
Final Goods Firm
The competitive …nal good …rm assembles all intermediate goods, y j;t ; j 2 (0; 1), to produce a …nal output, y t , which then sells at the price p t . This is produced using a 
Intermediate Goods Firms
The production of each …rm j is,
where z j;t captures the total productivity innovation experienced by …rm j, which is subject to both an economy-wide supply shock, A t ; and an idiosyncratic shock, " j;t ,
The economy-wide supply shock, A t , follows an AR(1) process, log A t = A log A t 1 + shock, " j;t , is uniformly distributed over the interval ("; "), with a constant variance and a mean of unity, so that at the symmetric aggregate equilibrium, z t = A t . 8 Each …rm borrows loans to cover its working capital, in real terms 9 ,
In a good state the …rm repays the lending bank the full borrowing cost, R l t l j;t = R l t w t h t , where R l t is the gross loan rate, as set in the …nancial contract between the bank and the …rm (derived below). As production is risky, borrowing requires some collateral that the …rm can pledge in the event of default. It is assumed that in the latter case the lender seizes a fraction of the …rm's output as collateral. 10 Default occurs when the real value of seizable collateral is less than the amount that needs to be repaid, y j;t < R l t l j;t : Using eqs (6) and (8), the maximum cut-o¤ value below which the …rm defaults is,
The cut-o¤ value is a function of the cost of borrowing, R l t , the cost of labour, w t , the share , and the aggregate productivity shock, A t .
Price setting is based on Calvo-type contracts, where ! p …rms keep their prices …xed, while the rest (1 ! p ) of …rms adjust prices optimally by taking the loan rate, (derived below), as given. Each …rm j maximizes,
subject to, j t = P j;t Pt y j;t mc t y j;t and eqs (6) (7) (8) (9) , where from the …rm's cost minimization problem real marginal cost is,
From the …rm's maximization problem the new Keynesian Phillips curve equation is,
where (11) is a standard new Keynesian Phillips curve with a cost channel, mc t (R l t ), however, as shown below, the loan rate here is driven by both the probability of default and other key …nancial variables.
The Financial Sector
The …nancial sector is represented by a competitive bank with two branch-banks: a deposit bank and a lending bank. 10 See also Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar (2014). 11 Hats denote log-linearizations from steady state.
The Deposit Bank
The deposit bank receives deposits from all households; it keeps a fraction of its deposits as total reserves, e r t , at the central bank for which it receives a gross interest on reserves, R ior t , and makes the rest of its deposits, (1 e r t )d t , available to the lending bank at the gross interbank rate R t . The interbank rate, R t , which is also the policy rate here, the required reserve ratio, & t , and the interest rate on required and excess reserves, R ior t , are set by the central bank. The deposit bank's maximization problem is,
where the bene…ts and costs of keeping excess reserves, e r t & t , are captured by the cost function, G e r t ( ), where 1 < 0, and 2 > 0. With t = 0; G e r t ( ) reduces to the convex cost function used in Glocker and Towbin (2012) , where the quadratic term, 2 ( ), captures the cost of maintaining reserves ,where the …rst term 1 (e r t & t ) captures any exogenous bene…ts of holding excess reserves 12 An innovation here is that I endogenize the latter.
In particular, I allow the bene…t of holding excess reserves to be increasing linearly with the probability, t , that at any point in time the bank will require a higher fraction of excess reserves (e r t & t )d t . I consider two main factors that can increase t : a potential risk in the non-…nancial sector, t (" t ) where risky bank loans are ultimately used, and the announcement of some news, or other exogenous shocks, t ,
where 3 > 0 is a pass-through elasticity discussed below. Thus, t is driven both endogenously, by the degree which banks perceive a potential credit risk in the non…nancial sector, and exogenously through a stochastic process.
13 12 Glocker and Towbin (2012) use the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) framework to show that when the loss function of the central bank incorporates a …nancial stability objective, the use of reserve requirements can lead to non-negligible welfare improvements. Their policy analysis focuses mainly on the e¤ects of the required reserve ratio, while the interest on reserves is assumed to be constant. 13 In Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), the relative usefulness of excess reserves is determined purely by an exogenous stochastic process. In Dressler and Kirsting (2015) excess reserves are chosen in a process where banks draw an idiosyncratic lending cost that can be high or low and this determines whether loans are made or alternatively excess reserves increase. Thus, although in their model …rms also borrow for their working capital, the risk is modelled implicitly by banks and so there is no transmission of risk from the non-…nancial sector to banks; also monetary policy is conducted purely by exogenous money growth. They show that increases in the real loan rate increases the deposit rate and this can overturn the e¤ects of money injections.
From its maximization problem, (12) , the deposit bank sets the deposit rate,
and the fraction of deposits it wants to keep as excess reserves,
With t = 0; a …xed positive level of excess reserves measured by 1 = 2 > 0; ( 1 < 0) is held by the deposit bank, as in Glocker and Towbin (2012) , and the only variable driving excess reserves endogenously is the opportunity cost of holding reserves, measured by the spread between the interbank rate and interest on reserves, R t R ior t . More importantly here, excess reserves increase with the probability t that the bank will require precautionary reserves, either because of a potential risk in the non-…nancial sector, t (" t ); or because of exogenous shocks, t . Obviously the size of the pass through elasticity, 3 , matters here. A high 3 implies that banks perceive a high risk coming from creditors in the non-…nancial markets, increasing their desired level of excess reserves. If
The Lending Bank
The lending bank raises (1 e r t )d t funds from the deposit bank at the inter-bank gross rate, R t ; and also issues regulatory bank capital, e t ; at the gross rate R e t . 14 The lending bank can also receives extra liquidity l cb t from the central bank which is remunerated also at the policy rate, R t . 15 The lending bank's balance sheet in real terms is,
The lending rate is set at the beginning of the period, before …rms engage in production activity and pricing decisions. Given a competitive banking environment it is assumed that, on average, the bank breaks even such that the expected income from lending to …rms is equal to the total costs of borrowing these funds (deposits, bank equity and liquidity from the central bank) to …rm j. 16 The lending bank's expected intra-period zero pro…t condition from lending to …rm j is,
where f (" j;t ) is the probability density function of " j;t . The …rst part of the left hand side of (17) is the expected repayment to the bank in the non-default state, while the second part is the expected return to the bank in the default state, including the collateral commitment, t y j;t , which forms part of the …nancial contract. The right hand side is the total cost of funds, where % l t captures all other exogenous costs related to loans l j;t (i.e. including transaction, monitoring costs and other loan-related innovations).
where % L is its mean value, and % t is an i.i.d. normal random variable with zero mean and standard deviation % . Substitute (6) and (7) into (17), together with R l t l j;t = A t " j;t h t (from 9), to obtain,
To …nd an explicit expression for the probability of default, I use the fact that " j;t follows a uniform distribution over the interval ("; "), with a probability density 1=( " ") and a 14 Since raising funds through equity is more costly for the bank ( R e t > R t ), bank equity is issued merely to satisfy regulatory bank capital requirements in this model. 15 Introducing a liquidity injection, l cb t ; is simply to allow the markets to clear at equilibrium, (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006) . 16 This condition is employed purely for simplicity and clarity as the focus of this paper is not on the monopolistc power of banks, (Dreschler, Savov and Schnabl, 2017).
mean " = ( " + ")=2 = 1: Using this and the de…nitions (1 e r t )d t + l cb t = l t e t , (from 16), and t = e t =l t , where t is the bank capital-to-loan ratio, the loan rate is,
where y t = A t h t and t ("
, is the probability of credit default. 18 From (18), the loan rate is shown to increase, the stricter is bank regulation, (capitalto-loan ratio) t , the higher is bank equity spread, (R e t R t ), and the higher is the risk premium (third term in 18), which is a function of the probability of loan default t (" t ),
the loan-to-ouput value l t =y t , and the fraction of collateral, ; it is also subject to the …nancial shock, % L t . Thus credit risk in the non-…nancial sector raises the loan rate spread and thus the cost of borrowing for …rms. In the …nancial sector, depending on the value of 3 0, this credit risk can also generate an accumulation of precautionary reserves. The interest on reserves and the required reserve ratio a¤ect the loan rate through two channels: (i) through the balance sheet, as they a¤ect total reserves that determine the level of credit to …rms, (15 and 16), and (ii) through their e¤ect on the deposit rate, (14) , which in turn also a¤ects the equity rate, R e t (5).
Monetary Policy
The policy interest rate, R t , is set according to a conventional Taylor rule,
where, 2 (0; 1) is the degree of interest rate smoothing; y ; > 0, are policy coe¢ cients and y t =y t x t is the output gap. The policy rate has a direct e¤ect on two important channels in this model, the cost of borrowing channel and the deposits channel. It works through the cost channel by a¤ecting the loan rate, (18) , which a¤ects the marginal cost, (10) , and in ‡ation, (11) . It works through the deposits channel by a¤ecting the deposit rate (14) , which in turn a¤ects the household's intertemporal substitution of consumption, 17 The cut-o¤ value, " j;t ; depends on the state of the economy and at equilibrium is identical across all …rms. Similarly, real wages and the labour employed by each …rm are identical and therefore the loan rate applies to all …rms and so in what follows the subscript j is dropped. 18 The default risk of the …rm is fully transmitted to the bank. As the bank's total funds are provided to identical …rms and the loan rate has been derived from a break even condition, it is implied that at equilibrium when the …rm's default condition is satis…ed the bank would also no longer break even (see also 17). Hence, with no loss in generality,.the bank's default probability is approximated to the …rm's default probability, t (" t ), (3) , but also the bank equity return (5), which in turn also a¤ects the loan rate (18) and hence the cost channel. 19 Monetary policy can also be supported by the required reserve ratio and the interest on reserves. Both these tools a¤ect the deposits channel and the balance sheet channel; they are examined in more detail in sections 5.3 and 5.3.1.
The Log-linearized Aggregate Equilibrium
At the aggregate equilibrium and with no …xed capital investment or government intervention, aggregate demand is determined by aggregate consumption, y t = c t . On the production side equilibrium also requires that The model is log-linearized around its non-stochastic, zero in ‡ation, ‡exible price steady state. The ‡exible price level of output is, y
is the price mark-up and R l;f t is the loan rate under ‡exible prices. The e¢ cient level of output, free of both …nancial frictions and nominal rigidities and estimated at a constant policy rate, is y t =
20 Also, for the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that the bank capital requirement constraint remains …xed, so that t = . 21 The loglinearized versions of (3), (4), (5), (11) (14), (15) , (16) and (18), can then be used to express the model in terms of the e¢ cient output gap, b
the in ‡ation rate, b t , the equity rate, b R e t , the deposit rate b R d t , total reserves, b e r t , loans, b l t , the loan rate, b R l t and the default risk, b t ,
where
19 Dreschler, Savov and Schnal (2017), show that the policy rate can a¤ect the deposits channel through the monopolistic power of banks. This channel is relaxed here as it is not the focus of this paper. 20 See Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . 21 Changes in the bank capital constraints can be important for balance sheet e¤ects and the supply side of credit, though this is not the focus of this paper. Moreover, there is evidence that bank capital constraints could not explain the massive scale rise observed in liquidity hoarding by banks and their unwillingness to lend following the 2007 …nancial crisis ( Ennis and Wolman, 2015) .
where b R t is determined by the log-linearized Taylor rule, 
Steady State and Parameterization
The key steady state equations are, R = 1= ; R e =
; where
, and
. Table 1 is the average ratio (usually between 1-3%) in OECD countries. 23 The baseline steady state spread between the policy rate and interest on reserves is set to R R ior = 100 bps (quarterly), and the values of 1 ; 2 and 3 are chosen so that at the steady state with default probability, = 3%; total excess reserves are, e r & 2% and total reserves are, 22 The value of = 0:97 is justi…ed in Agénor, Bratsiotis and Pfajfar, (2014). 23 A 2% required reserve ratio also re ‡ects the ratio proposed recently for the Euro Zone countries. The persistence parameters and the standard deviations of the …nancial shock and the supply shock are calibrated in line with Benes and Kumhof (2015) , where % = 0:87 and % = 0:11, while A = 0:92 and A = 0:024, respectively.
26 24 This partly mimics a Basel II type regulation, where borrowers'credit risk, , is taken into account in the determination of the overall bank capital ratio. 25 For the steady state values of the equity and loans rates we also use, % E = 0:028 and % L = 0:008: 26 Christiano, Motto and Rostagno aslo report a riskiness shock of % = 0:119:
Optimal Simple Policy Rules and Welfare
This section uses a numerical welfare analysis to determine the optimal responses of monetary policy rules following …nancial and supply shocks. The central bank's objective function is derived by a second order approximation around the e¢ cient steady state of the household's expected utility function (1) , where the consumer's welfare losses are expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption 27 ,
where, b x t = b y t b y t is the welfare relevant output gap and b y t is the log deviation of the e¢ cient output from its steady-state. The average welfare loss per period is given by,
The net welfare gain from the simple optimal policy rules considered are estimated based on the di¤erence in consumer welfare losses between the baseline policy rule W B and the optimal policy rule W
100;
where the higher is CE, a consumption equivalent measure, the larger is the net welfare gain from the optimal policy.
Precautionary Liquidity and Optimal Taylor Rule Responses
This section examines the role of the precautionary liquidity and the size of excess reserves for monetary policy. 27 The derivation of the welfare loss function follows Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , who also incorporate the monetary policy cost channel. In the e¢ cient steady state, price mark ups and …nancial distortions are eliminated through appropriate subsidies. 28 The grid search range is, = [0; 3]; and x = [0; 1]. Result 1: At low levels of precautionary liquidity and thus excess reserves the optimal response of the Taylor rule is to maintain its focus on in ‡ation. As precautionary liquidity rises to higher levels, raising the deposit rate, the optimal response of the Taylor rule is to reduce its relative weight on in ‡ation. This result holds for both …nancial and supply shocks, although it is stronger for the former. Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 . Following …nancial and real shocks the optimal response of the policy rate is shown to be largely determined by the level of excess reserves. When excess reserves are around low steady state levels, (i.e.
Result 1 follows directly from
2-8% of total deposits), the optimal policy response to a …nancial shock that reduces the output gap and increases in ‡ation (due to the cost channel), is to increase the policy rate so as to curb in ‡ation. However, as excess reserves rise, the optimal response of the policy rate is to decrease the relative weight on in ‡ation with respect to the output gap. This result can be explained as follows. At low levels of excess reserves, a …nancial shock that raises the cost of borrowing, or an adverse supply shock, increase the in ‡ation rate requiring the policy rate to increase (see Black(o) line: ER=2% of total deposits).
However, when precautionary liquidity is high the deposits channel becomes stronger, as both the proportion of deposits held as excess reserves and the deposit rate rise. Higher excess reserves imply a reduced supply of loans (through the balance sheet channeleq. 16), while the higher deposit rate reduces (through the households intertemporal substitution e¤ect) the output gap and the in ‡ation rate, which also eases in ‡ationary pressures and allows the policy rate to decrease, (see Figures 3 and 4) . The fall in the policy rate also reduces the probability of default and the cost of borrowing, thus further reducing the in ‡ation rate and the policy rate through the …nancial accelerator. In the case of an adverse supply shock, where both the output gap and in ‡ation increase, it takes a much higher level of excess reserves for the monetary policy to abandon it antiin ‡ationary stance. In this example, it takes excess reserves of over 40% of total deposits for monetary policy to start reducing its weight on in ‡ation, but at such critical levels of excess reserves the welfare gains from such policy are shown to be very small.
Proposition 1:
When the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound a necessary condition for determinacy is that 3 > 0, that is, there is a positive degree of precautionary liquidity that raises the deposit rate above the policy rate.
Proof. A formal proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix.
It is a well-established fact that in this general class of macro models a …xed interest rate results in indeterminacy, (see Woodford 2011) . Here it is shown that when the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound, a positive degree of precautionary liquidity ( 3 > 0) can result in determinacy. This is because with 3 > 0; the deposit rate responds to credit risk which a¤ects both the cost channel and in ‡ation (through the loan rate) but also the output gap (through marginal cost -eq 28). With the policy rate at the zero-bound, as the degree of precautionary liquidity increases the deposit rate can increase above the policy rate, thus acting as a 'substitute'for the policy rate (see R-RD spread in Figures 3   and 4) . This implies that even in the absence of an active monetary policy, the economy can be self-disciplined through 'prudent'banking, in the form of precautionary liquidity hoarding that decreases the supply of loans and raises the deposit rate in response to credit riskiness, which help pin down a unique equilibrium. Result 2: At high steady state levels of precautionary liquidity and excess reserves, the optimal weight on in ‡ation in the Taylor rule can be shown to be less than unity, ( < 1). This is a determinate equilibrium despite the violation of the Taylor principle. Determinacy holds because the desire for excess liquidity drives the deposit rate above the policy rate, with the former controlling the behavior of consumption (Euler equation) and in ‡ation.
This follows directly from Proposition 1, in combination with the results in Table 2, and Figures 3 and 4 . In a conventional model where the deposit rate does not deviate from the policy rate, the Taylor principle cannot be violated because the policy rate is also the rate that pins down the behavior of consumption and aggregate demand. In this conventional case a lower-zero bound interest rate would result in indeterminacy.
Excess Reserves Shocks ( b t ) and Monetary Policy
This section considers the role of monetary policy when excess reserves increase in response to a stochastic shock b t ; i.e. due to news or other exogenous shocks. 29 We assume Unlike a loan rate, or a negative aggregate supply shock, that increase in ‡ation through credit frictions and the cost channel, a stochastic increase in excess reserves causes, loans, the output gap and hence in ‡ation to decrease but the deposit rate to increase, given the sudden increase in the demand for reserves. Since excess reserves shocks move the in ‡ation rate and the deposit rate in opposite directions, the policy rate is required to intervene and stabilize in ‡ation. In Figure 5 the optimal response of the Taylor rule is shown to suggest a reduction of the policy rate, below the baseline case, so as to stabilize loans, the output gap and in ‡ation.
Result 3: Following a stochastic increase in excess reserves, the optimal response in the Taylor rule is to keep a relative high weight on in ‡ation. This is because such a shock causes the in ‡ation rate and the deposit rate to move in opposite directions thus requiring the intervention of the policy rate. 
The E¤ects of the Interest on Reserves and the Required Reserve Ratio on the Deposits Channel
From (14) and (15) the required reserve ratio, & t , and the interest on reserves, R ior t , are shown to a¤ect the deposits channel through both the balance sheet e¤ect (total reserves) and the deposit rate e¤ect, though not in the same way. Both monetary policy tools have a positive e¤ect on total reserves, @e r t =@& t = 1 > 0, and @e r t =@R
respectively. Thus a higher required reserve ratio, or a higher interest on reserves, increase total reserves and reduces loans available for loans. This is a balance sheet e¤ect which restricts the amount of credit available in the economy, (see 16) and has a negative impact on the output gap and in ‡ation. However, the e¤ects that these two monetary policy tools have on the deposits channel through the deposit rate work in opposite directions.
The e¤ect of the required reserve ratio on the deposit rate is expected to be negative.
In particular, @R
0, assuming, R ior t R t . Thus, the higher is the opportunity cost of holding deposits as reserves, (receiving R ior t ), rather than making them available in the interbank market, (receiving R t ), the larger is this negative e¤ect. This result is consistent with studies that show that the required reserve ratio acts as 'a tax 'on bank deposits, which then banks pass on to the depositor as a lower deposit rate. 30 Thus a higher required reserve ratio lowers the deposit rate, with the latter e¤ect mitigating the balance sheet e¤ect of the former, by encouraging a higher output gap and in ‡ation.
In contrast, the e¤ect of the interest on reserves on the deposit rate is positive. From
( 1 < 0 and 2 > 0) and thus a higher interest on reserves increases the deposit rate. This is because the interest on reserves acts as 'a subsidy' on bank deposits thus encouraging a higher deposit rate. 31 Since, the e¤ect of the interest on reserves on total reserves is also positive, @e r t =@R ior t > 0, a higher interest on reserves will also reduce the reserves available for credit. Thus here both the e¤ects of the deposits channel (i.e. through higher excess reserves and a higher deposit rate) work in a complementary way in reducing the size of borrowing, (the cost channel), the output gap and in ‡ation. This, as shown next, implies that the use of the interest on reserves requires a lower intervention from the policy rate and it can deliver higher welfare gains than the required reserve ratio.
Optimal Policy Responses with Interest on Reserves or Required Reserve Ratio
This section examines the optimal responses of the Taylor rule, (19) , when the latter is facilitated by either a required reserve ratio rule or an interest on reserves rule, as shown by (30) and (31) below. Some recent studies show that required reserve ratio rules that respond in a countercyclical fashion to macroprudential or …nancial variables, such as credit or credit spreads, can help promote …nancial and macro stability. 32 Accordingly, the following rule for the required reserve ratio is considered,
where the elasticity used by a number of central banks (including the US Fed and the ECB) to facilitate their credit liquidity management and has attracted much research attention in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 33 Accordingly, the following rule for the interest on reserves is examined,
where l ior measures the responsiveness of the interest on reserves to credit deviations from its steady state. 35 
Result 4:
As supporting monetary policy tools, both the required reserve ratio and the interest on reserves can improve on the welfare outcomes achieved by just a simple optimal Taylor rule. However, the interest on reserves can achieve higher welfare gains than the required reserve ratio because of the con ‡icting e¤ect that the latter has through the deposits channel (i.e. the balance sheet and the deposit rate e¤ects). This result is independent of precautionary liquidity.
Result 4 follows from section 5.3, Tables 2 and 3 , and Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 , demonstrates this result for the case of a …nancial shock when liquidity hoarding is zero, ( 3 =0, which implies excess reserves of about 2% of total deposits). 36 The …nancial shock raises, the probability of default, the cost of borrowing and in ‡ation and reduces the output gap. The optimal response of the required reserve ratio is to cause a rise in the deposit rate but, as shown in section 5.3, this can only be achieved with a decrease in the required reserve ratio which frees some reserves for loans through the balance sheet. Hall and Reis (2016) . 34 Note that both these policy tools could also respond to a number of other …nancial variables but the results are not expected to be very di¤erent. For example, allowing them to respond to the loan rate
), produces very similar results. These results can be made available upon request. 35 The optimal policy parameters are grid-searched within the following ranges, . 36 The results for the optimal Taylor rule (Black(o) line=OTR), are given in Table 2 (a) and (b) respectively. The interest on reserves is shown to stabilize in ‡ation and the output gap more effectively through the deposits and balance sheet channels, by having a stronger e¤ect on the deposit rate, while simultaneously raising the level of excess reserves and reducing loans. This takes the pressure o¤ the policy rate, which does not have to be as aggressive as in the cases of the simple optimal Taylor rule (OTR), or the latter supported by the required reserve ratio (OTR+&). A lower policy rate implies that the default probability, the bank equity rate, the loan rate and hence marginal cost and in ‡ation are lower, which in turn support a low policy rate. Similar results are shown in the case of an adverse technology shock, in Figure 7 , where the combination of a strong response to in ‡ation, combined with a rise in the interest on reserves is shown to stabilize in ‡ation and the output gap more e¤ectively than the required reserve ratio. This result is shown to be independent of the degree of precautionary liquidity. 
where ER ior measures the policy responsiveness to excess reserves and (ii) the interest on reserves responds directly to deviations of credit risk from its steady state level,
where ior measures the policy responsiveness to credit risk. Both (32) and (33) imply that the interest on reserves responds to changes in the level of credit riskiness in the economy, the former through the e¤ect that credit risk has on the level of excess reserves, whereas the latter directly. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results.
Proposition 2: When the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound a necessary condition for determinacy is that ior > 0, that is, the interest on reserves can a¤ect the deposit channel in response to changes in the credit riskiness in the economy, when the latter a¤ects the output gap and the cost channel (in ‡ation). This result is independent of the level of precautionary liquidity in the banking system, ( 3 0), or the …scal theory of the price level.
Proof. A formal proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Appendix. Result 5: When the policy rate is at the zero-bound the interest on reserves can act as a single monetary policy tool, through its e¤ects on the deposits channels, producing higher welfare gains than a simple Taylor rule.
Result 5, follows from Proposition 2, Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 7 and 8 that plot the optimal responses of the interest on reserves rules (eqs. 32 and 33), at the zero-bound, b R t = 0. The intuition here is that the source of credit friction, that is the level of credit riskiness in the economy, a¤ects the output gap and in ‡ation (through the cost channel).
Thus, by responding to the level of credit riskiness in the economy, the interest on reserves can pin down in ‡ation and the output gap, through the deposits channel, that is through its e¤ects on the balance sheets of banks and the deposit rate. This is demonstrated in Figures 7 and 8 , where following a …nancial shock that raises in ‡ation, the optimal response of the interest on reserves is to increase, resulting in higher excess reserves, a fall in loans and a higher deposit rate, which reduce the output gap, the loan spread and the cost of borrowing and thus in ‡ation. Tables (4) and (5) 
The Role of the Interest on Reserves
In much of the above analysis we have assumed a positive steady state spread between the policy rate and the interest on reserves, R > R ior . In practice however, since its introduction in 2008, the US Fed has been setting the interest rate on reserves equal to the policy rate. 37 Moreover, there is evidence that the federal funds rate regularly traded below the interest on reserves (Goodfriend 2015) . The R t R ior t spread determines the opportunity cost of holding reserves. The lower is the interest on reserves in relation to the policy rate the higher is the 'tax on holding reserves' (Ireland, 2015) . Conversely, the smaller is the R t R ior t spread, the higher is expected to be the level of excess reserves. Indeed, Table 6 shows that the steady state level of excess reserves increases as the R R ior spread is reduced from 100bps to 0 bps. Here, with no precautionary liquidity, ( 3 =0.001, and ER=2.0%) or other factors a¤ecting the level of excess reserves, a rise in the spread by 100 basis points is shown to result in an 1% increase in excess reserves at the steady state. This tends to restrict lending, which as Table 6 shows, can result in some small welfare gains when policy is concerned with in ‡ation. However, this does not necessarily imply that setting the interest on reserves equal to the policy rate is the best central banks could do with this policy tool. Table 7 is based on exactly the same parameterization as Table 6 , but allows the interest on reserves to deviate from R ior t = R t and respond optimally to either excess reserves (eq. 32) or directly to credit risk (eq 33). It is shown that using the interest on reserves as an independent policy tool to facilitate monetary policy can increase welfare gains beyond those of a simple Taylor Rule, or simply setting, R ior t = R t . This result, which follows from Tables 6 and 7 , is due to the e¤ects that the interest on reserves can have through the deposits channel, as already explained in sections 5.3 and 5.3.1.
Concluding Discussion
This paper emphasizes the importance of the deposits channel in explaining the role of monetary policy, particularly during periods when the policy rate is …xed at the lower zero-bound. Two new potential factors that can determine monetary policy through the deposits channel are identi…ed: precautionary liquidity in times of high perceived risk and the interest on reserves.
It is shown that high levels of excess reserves in the …nancial sector, due to a potential credit risk in the real sector, imply a lower optimal relative weight on in ‡ation in the Taylor rule. The intuition of this is that when the …nancial sector perceives credit riskiness to be high, precautionary liquidity raises excess reserves and restricts loans to the real sector, while the deposit rate (the rate o¤ered on liquid assets) that a¤ects intertemporal household decisions, can rise above the policy rate. Both these e¤ects of the deposits channel act as a self-discipline device in the banking system that is shown to pin down the in ‡ation rate and provide a unique equilibrium even when the policy rate is at the zerobound. In practice, the extent to which precautionary liquidity can e¤ect the deposits channel depends on how the …nancial sector perceives credit riskiness, because as the model indicates even when the actual credit risk, t (" t ) is high, if banks undermine such risk (implying a low pass-through elasticity 3 ), then the deposits channel may be too weak to determine a unique equilibrium without the intervention of the policy rate.
A more active role for monetary policy, particularly at the zero-bound, is to try and a¤ect the deposits channel through the interest on reserves. When banks become unresponsive to the policy rate that sets the benchmark for their transactions at the interbank market, they may become more responsive to the rate o¤ered on the reserves they are sitting on. This paper shows that through its e¤ect on the deposits channel, the interest on reserves can act as a single monetary policy tool that can provide determinacy but also a higher welfare gain than a simple Taylor However, if the interest on reserves responds to the level of credit riskiness in the economy, (a rule shown to perform particularly well in this paper), then the latter may be harder to calculate and so the level of excess reserves may be preferred as a proxy to perceived risk. The …ndings also question whether the current practice of setting the interest on reserves equal to the policy rate, (i.e. US Fed, Bank of England), undermine the full potential of the interest on reserves as an independent policy tool. The paper also shows that the required reserve ratio can a¤ect the deposits channel, but its e¤ectiveness is weaker because of the con ‡icting e¤ects it has through this channel that overall makes the interest on reserves a more welfare-enhancing monetary policy tool that also requires less interest rate intervention.
In general, the …ndings in this paper may shed some light on the zero-interest rate policy observed in countries that experienced large excess reserves. It can also justify why the interest on reserves, rather than required reserves, became the focus of monetary policy during the zero-bound period in a number of countries. Overall, the paper invites more research on the determinants of the deposits channel for explaining the role and e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, particularly in times of unconventional monetary policy, but also on the potential role of the interest on reserves as an independent monetary policy tool.
APPENDIX
Proposition 1: When the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound a necessary condition for determinacy is that 3 > 0, that is, there is a positive degree of precautionary liquidity that raises the deposit rate above the policy rate.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider a simpli…ed version of the-lower zero bound case where the policy rate is …xed around its steady state value of R = 1= (hence b R t = 0). We also assume t = 0 hence t = 3 t (" t ) and the required reserve ratio and the interest on reserves are also …xed, so that b R ior t = b & t = 0, as assumed in Table 2 . These assumptions imply that the model can be reduced to three log-linearized equations,
Substituting b R From this and the de…nition of B and above, it is shown that when the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound, a necessary condition for determinacy is that, 3 > 0: Eliminating precautionary liquidity, that is setting 3 = 0, results in B = 0 and the determinacy condition is not met, as G( 3 = 0) = 1. This implies that in the absence of an active policy rate, ( b R t = 0), which could a¤ect the deposit rate, setting 3 = 0, entirely eliminates the endogenous response of the deposit rate to the output gap and in ‡ation (see b R d t above) and the model becomes indeterminate as in the standard case. Figure 10 , shows the determinacy region (shaded area above unity) for di¤erent values of 3 , at the zero-bound and keeping all other parameters constant at their baseline level (see Table   1 ). Based on this example, it is shown that any value, 0 < 3 . 7:88 can provide determinacy. The discontinuity above this value occurs because as reserves rise above a certain level, (here approximately above 30% of total deposits), then in the absence of active monetary policy (i.e. at the zero bound and with no intervention of any other monetary policy tool), further rises in 3 can increase B to a level beyond which turns negative, thus reducing the deposit rate and the e¤ectiveness of the deposit channel. This also reduces G( 3 ) to below unity thus resulting in indeterminacy.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider a simpli…ed version of the zero-bound case where the policy rate is …xed b R t = 0, around its steady state value of R = 1= , as before, but here we only assume that the required reserve ratio is …xed, b & t = 0, and allow the interest on reserves to vary, as employed in section 5.4. These assumptions imply the model can be reduced to the following three equations,
b R It follows that a necessary condition for a determinate equilibrium is, e G( ior ) = 1 + e B(1 )( + + e ) " " " > 1:
It follows that if the policy rate is …xed at the zero-bound, b R t = 0, and there is no precautionary liquidity in the banking system, ( 3 = 0), then a necessary condition for a determinate equilibrium is ior > 0. With 3 = 0; setting ior = 0 results in e B = 0, hence the condition for a unique equilibrium cannot be satis…ed as e G( ior = 0) = 1. Figure 11, shows the determinacy region for di¤erent values of ior at the zero bound b R t = 0, when R = R ior = 1= , 1 = 3 = 0 and (steady state) ER = 0%: 
G
Based on this example, it is shown that any value, 0 < ior . 3:1 can provide determinacy. The discontinuity above this value occurs because setting very high values of ior can increase e B to a level beyond which e turns negative and this reduces the deposit rate and the e¤ectiveness of the deposit channel. This also reduces e G( ior ) to below unity thus resulting in indeterminacy.
